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FRISCO JOES, INC. , a Utah
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Case No. 14,515

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
ELLIS Y. PEAY, GORDON HALL
and KENNETH HOSTETTER,
Defendants-Respondents

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT PEAY IN OPPOSITION
TO PETITION FOR REHEARING

* * * * * * * * * *
BOYD L. PARK
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IN THE SUPREI1E COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FRISCO JOES, I!JC. , a Utah
corporation, DONALD VAUGHN
TOLMAN and JOANNA TOLMAN ,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Case No, 14,515

vs.
ELLIS Y. PEAY, GORDO!.J HALL
and KENNETH HOSTETTER,
Defendants-Respondents

BRIEF OF RESPO!JDENT PEAY IN OPPOSITION
TO PETITION FOR REHEARING
To the Honorable Chief Justice and the Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah:

The respondent respectfully

submits that the petition for a rehearing should be denied.

THE PETITION PRESE!.JTS NO QUESTION \'lHICH HAS !.JOT
fULLY CONSIDERED IN THE ORIGINAL DECISION OF THIS COURT.
As stated in 5 Am Jr. 2d, Appeal and Error, Sec.
988, rehearings are not proper merely for the purpose of reargument.
In this appeal, petitioners simply raise again the same argument
of a "Sale" which they urged in the trial court and also presented
to this court through their appellate argument and brief.

The issue has been decided, yet your petitioners desire its'
~argument

in the form of a hearing.
The nagging problem inherent in the "Sale" theory

l
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is its' continuing reliance on petitioner's version of the
facts rather than on the facts as found by the trial court.
In paragraph 14 of its Findings of Fact, the trial court found
as follows:
"14. On or about April 1, 1975, defendant Peay was
informed through the officers and agents of Restaurant
Stores and Equipment, that the kitchen equipment and
certain other items of personal property used in the
operation of Frisco Joes, an eating establishment,
was being purchased from Restaurant Stores and Equipment,
on a promissory note and security agreement, which
had been assigned to Walker Bank. That the payment
provided for in said promissory note and security
agreement were in arrears, and that Restaurant Stores
and Equipment intended to foreclose on the said
items of personal property and repossess the same
unless the note and security agreement were brought
current.
Thereafter, defendants Hall and Hostetter
made arrangements with Walker Bank and Restaurant
Stores and equipment to take over the delinquent
loan on the said restaurant equipment and other
items of personal property and to date of trial
had paid $300.00 to Restaurant Stores and Equipment
on arrearages, and had paid $1,404.00 to Walker
Bank on the said note and security agreement.
This finding specifically negates any implication
of a "sale" of the personal property by defendant/respondent
Peay to defendants Hall and Hostetter.

The evidence adduced

at trial amply supports this finding, as the following quotations
from the trial transcript illustrate.
Defendant Hall testifieu that he and Hostetter
were purchasing the property by paying off the delinquent
note which encumbered it.
"Q.

What is your understanding regarding the

ownership of that personal property?
weFunding
were
purchasing
Sponsored by the S.J.A.
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Q.

From Whom?

A.

From -- We were paying the note from Restaurant

stores and Equipment and Walker Bank."

(TR. 144)

Defendant Peay testifed that he did not "sell"
Hall and Hostetter the equipment.
"Q.

And this was even after you had locked him

out and you had released the building and sold the equipment
~

Mr. Hall and Mr. Hostetter?
A.

No, I hadn't sold them the equipment.

Q.

Well, you had your attorney prepare an agreement

to sell it to them and you had received a down payment, hadn't
you?
A.

I received $200.00, and then when I found that

it was going to be repossessed I told them they had better
go and deal direct with the company, and I applied their
$200.00 to rent, that they had given me."

(TR 186).

The record clearly shows that the $200.00 payment
which petitioners allege was made from Hall and Hostetter
~

Peay to purchase equipment was actually used to pay rent.

As defendant Hall testifed:
(I)nstead of paying him (Peay) $400.00 for
May's lease payment we paid $200.00 with the understanding
that the prior $200.00 that we had put down on
the equipment was to go from May's lease and that
we would take over payments to Walker Bank beginning
with April and pick up the amount of past dues
that Restaurant Stores and Equipment had paid to
Walker Bank in the amount of $795.00, I think it
was,"
(TR 151).
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The petitioners, in support of their "sale" theory
objected to the trial courts finding by filing their "Objections
to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Proposed
Additional Findings of Fact."

In paragraph 3 of their "Objections",

petitioners asked the court to revise this proposed finding to
show "that the defendant Peay leased the premises and sold
the personal property owned by the plaintiffs to the defendants
Hall and Hostetter."

(emphasis added) •

In paragraphs 4 and 5 of their "Objections" petitionen
specifically asked the trial court to make certain additional
findings of fact in their favor.

They requested the court

to find that,
"4. The defendant Peay sold all of the personal
property in the building and owned by the plaintiffs to the
defendants Hall and Hostetter and received a check from Hall
and Hostetter in the sum of $1,000.00 on or about April 1,
1975, $200.00 of which was the initial payment on the personal
property.
5. Defendants Hall and Hostetter claim to be the
owners of all of the personal property situated in the building
by reason of purchasing the property from the defendant Peay."
The trial Judge, however, who had the oppor.tunity
of seeing and hearing the witnesses and passing on their
credibility, specifically rejected the petitioners objections
and proposed findings of fact, entered the finding reproduced
as paragraph 14 above, and entered the following conclusion
of law:
"The evidenced fails to establish by a preponderance
thereof any conversion of personal property by
any of the defendants."
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Though petitioners persistently and effectively argued their
theory of a "sale", the court found "no sale". Such a finding
by the trial court should not be disturbed on appeal.
}lardy v. Hendrickson 27 Utah 2d 251, 495 P. 2d 28

See

(1972), First

Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Wright, 521 P.2d 563 (1974).
The petitioners then argued their theory of a "sale"
based upon their own version of the facts, in this court.

The

characterization of the facts used by the petitioners is simply
not in accord with the facts as found by the trial court, nor
as affirmed by the Supreme Court.

The trial court negated any

implication of a "sale" by holding that there was no conversion
of any personal property by any of the defendants.

This court,

in considering the same question, properly approved the decision
of the trial court by holding that there was no wrongful exercise
of control over any of the personal property in violation of
the rights of its owner.
~urt

The petitioners' inference that this

did not consider the "sale" aspect of the case because

ilie term "sale" was not specifically treated in the opinion
is ill founded.

A court's silence on a material point must

be regarded as a finding against the party having t~e burden
of proof.

See generally, Ellis vs. Citizens' Nat. Bank. 183 Pac.

34,6 A.L.R., 166, 171 (1918).
The issue and question of a "sale" of personal property
by the defendant/respondent Peay to the defendants Hall and Hostetter,

in violation of plaintiff/petitioners rights has been fully developed,
briefed, and argued both here and in the trial court.
:~quest

Petitioner's

for rehearing of the same issue is nothing more than an

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 6
application for reargument.
for rehearing.

Such subject matter is not proper

See 5 Am Jur. 2d Appeal and Error, Sec 988,

~

v. Hagenbeck-Wallace Shows, 192 A. 464, 112 ALR 113, 124 (1937)
New York Life Ins. Co. vs. Nashville Tr. Co. 292

s.w.

2d 749,

59 ALR 2d 1086, 1107 (1918).
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully requested that the Petitio:.,
for Rehearing be denied.
DATED February 15, 1977.

Sumsion and Park
80 North 100 East
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorney for Respondent Peay

Christensen, Taylor and ~1oody
55 East Center Street
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorney for Respondent Peay
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